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The moral foundations theory supports that people, across cultures, tend to consider a small
number of dimensions when classifying issues on a moral basis. The data also show that the statistics
of weights attributed to each moral dimension is related to self-declared political affiliation, which
in turn has been connected to cognitive learning styles by recent literature in neuroscience and
psychology. Inspired by these data, we propose a simple statistical mechanics model with interacting
neural networks classifying vectors and learning from members of their social neighborhood about
their average opinion on a large set of issues. The purpose of learning is to reduce dissension among
agents even when disagreeing. We consider a family of learning algorithms parametrized by δ,
that represents the importance given to corroborating (same sign) opinions. We define an order
parameter that quantifies the diversity of opinions in a group with homogeneous learning style.
Using Monte Carlo simulations and a mean field approximation we find the relation between the
order parameter and the learning parameter δ at a temperature we associate with the importance
of social influence in a given group. In concordance with data, groups that rely more strongly on
corroborating evidence sustains less opinion diversity. We discuss predictions of the model and
propose possible experimental tests.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.65.Ef, 05.90.+m
I. INTRODUCTION
Sociophysics, the approach to mathematical modelling
of social science, is still maturing as a scientific field [1].
Opinion dynamics, voting, social influence and contagion
models have been thoroughly studied [2, 3], patterns in
social data have been identified (e.g. [4] or [5] and refer-
ences therein) and some successful predictions have been
achieved (e.g. [6]).
In this paper our aim is to present a data driven sta-
tistical mechanics model for the formation of opinions
about morality. We would like to verify if we can explain
features of social data by considering a stylized model
for neurocognitive processes well described in the litera-
ture. Clearly practical limits to such a goal have to be
considered. At the scale of individuals, neurocognitive
data inspiring any modeling are always exposed to eco-
logical validity issues with multiple uncontrolled causes.
At the social scale, we also have to keep in mind the
sheer complexity of human nature and human relation-
ships. By stylized model we here mean a model to be
used mainly to connect pieces of empirical evidence, to
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help the identification of important variables and as an
aid to formulate new empirical questions. Furthermore,
we would also like to have a model capable of making pre-
dictions after fitting a few key parameters to empirical
data.
We argue here and in our previous work [7] that the
evidence available on the moral classification problem
can be accommodated by assuming agents that are con-
formist classifiers adapting to their social neighborhood
by reinforcement learning. Empirical evidence regard-
ing different cognitive styles can then be represented in
the model as distinct learning algorithms following the
now established tradition of the statistical mechanics of
learning [8]. Studies on social psychology [9] allow the
further simplification of assuming that social influence
only takes place between individuals perceived as simi-
lar. As a first approximation we thus assume that the so-
cial network can be partitioned into homogeneous social
influence subnetworks, each one with a given cognitive
style or learning algorithm.
But what do these conformist agents classify? We as-
sume that any issue under debate can be parsed into a
discrete set of independent attributes or dimensions. The
modern theory of moral foundations [10] suggests that,
as far as morality is concerned, these dimensions are not
many more than five, namely: (a) harm/violence; (b)
justice/fairness; (c) in-group loyalty; (d) respect for au-
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2thority; and (e) purity or sanctity. For our modeling ef-
fort it is, however, sufficient that morality can be parsed
into a discrete number of identifiable dimensions. As a
starting point we do not consider the origin of these di-
mensions, its particular meanings or the practical issues
that may be involved in trying to parse a given subject
into these dimensions.These five dimensions have been
found empirically to be sufficient to characterize politi-
cal orientations along the liberal conservative spectrum.
The need for a sixth dimension, (f) liberty/oppression,
has been included to extend the description to extend
the spectrum to also include libertarians, but this is out-
side the scope of this article.
We thus consider that the moral content of an issue
may be represented by a direction in a unit radius D-
dimensional hypersphere x ∈ SD . In the course of daily
social relationships an individual j will be exposed to a
variety of issues of diverse moral content parsed as xµj
with µ = 1, 2, · · ·. For each of these issues an opin-
ion σµj ∈ [−1, 1] with a sign and an amplitude |σµj | is
displayed. The sign can be interpreted as providing a
for/against information and the amplitude as carrying
information on how convict individual j is. A way to de-
scribe a classification task of this sort is by assuming that
σµj = x
µ
j · Jj , where Jj is an adaptive internal representa-
tion, inaccessible to other individuals, used by individual
j to perform moral classification tasks. For simplicity we
will study the case where all moral vectors are normalized
to unit length Jj ∈ SD. This also implies that differences
in moral values are not interpreted as any type of moral
superiority and that no moral shallowness is implied by
the differences. Thus only the direction the moral vec-
tor points is considered as important, removing a layer
of complexity in the interpretation of the model.
A conformist individual will then seek agreement with
social neighbors in moral classifications by adjusting in-
ternal representation Jj . Employing the statistical me-
chanics of learning jargon, we are supposing that model
agents are interacting normalized linear perceptrons [8]
(for previous studies of interacting neural networks see
[11, 12] ).
The moral parsing of issues xµj is subjective, to say, two
individuals would not necessarily agree on how a given
issue should be parsed. To further simplify our model
we suppose that conformist classifiers do not adapt to
opinions about every issue separately, but, instead to a
normalized average over a large set of P issues:
hj =
( ∑P
µ=1 x
µ
j
‖∑Pµ=1 xµj ‖
)
· Jj (1)
Assuming that there are no relevant biases or correlations
in the individual parsing through the social network, we
write the opinion field as hj = Z · Jj , where the mean
issue
Z =
∑P
µ=1 x
µ
j
‖∑Pµ=1 xµj ‖ , (2)
is supposed to be objective (or independent of the index
j). We therefore suppose that conformist agents clas-
sify the average issue represented by the vector Z and
exchange information about their classifications in the
form of opinion fields hj = cos θj , where θj represents
the angle between the internal (moral) representation Jj
and a symmetry breaking direction Z given by the mean
issue parsed into moral dimensions.
For the sake of brevity we here only provide a short
summary of empirical evidence and focus on the sta-
tistical mechanics model. To the reader interested in
knowing more about relevant empirical sources we sug-
gest reading our previous work on the subject [7]. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that individuals are conformist
agents that adapt to each other by reinforcement learning
[13], that cognitive styles are diverse [14] and that agents
are more strongly influenced by other agents with similar
style. Learning styles can be parametrized by δ ∈ [0, 1]
that represents the difference in how the agent treats
corroborating (agreement) information against how she
deals with novelty (disagreement). Agents with larger δ,
weight disagreement and agreement more similarly, while
those with smaller δ give more weight to novelty than to
corroboration. Additionally, psychological and neurocog-
nitive data suggest a positive correlation between cogni-
tive style and self-declared political affiliation (p.a.)[14].
The aggregate behavior, represented by statistics of
the opinion fields h, can be derived using statistical me-
chanics and then compared to social data on moral foun-
dations. Given δ, the model predicts the shape of his-
tograms p(h|δ). If we postulate that cognitive style,
e.g. δ positively correlates with political affiliation, the
model also predicts certain aspects of the behavior of
p(h|p.a.). Alternatively, similarity between p(h|δ) and
p(h|p.a.) leads to a confirmation that cognitive style is
positively correlated to political affiliation.
The simultaneous comparison of six predicted his-
tograms p(h|p.a.) (p.a. = 1, 2, · · · , 6) with data requires
the selection of two phenomenological parameters: the
average node degree in the social influence subnetwork
k¯ and the average social pressure per social neighbor α.
A mean field approximation predicts that histograms de-
pend on the total social pressure, namely, on these two
parameters combined as k¯α. An optimization procedure,
designed to maximize the similarity between predicted
and empirical histograms, can then be used to estimate
k¯α.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the available data. Section III describes the
statistical mechanics model in detail and an analysis via
Monte Carlo simulations. Section IV treats analytically
a mean field version of the model. In SectionV we sim-
ulate the model in a real-world social graph provided by
the Facebook. The dynamical behavior of the model is
discussed in section VI. We discuss the meaning of di-
verse cognitive styles in the light of the model in section
VII. Finally, a section with conclusions and perspectives
is provided.
3FIG. 1. Experimental data - matrices of distances: top row,(A) 30 dimensional representation of subjects, bottom row,
(C) 5 dimensional space of moral foundations. Left column: before, Right column: (B) and (D), respectively, after application
of SPIN algorithm. Blue means near and red far.
II. DATA ON MORAL FOUNDATIONS
In a series of papers [10, 15–19] Jonathan Haidt
and coworkers have described moral foundation theory
(MFT), an heuristically driven theory dealing with the
foundations of moral psychology. Its aim is to understand
statistically significant differences in moral valuations of
social issues and their association to coordinates of a po-
litical spectrum.
Following Kohlberg [20] and Gilligan [21] work in moral
psychology in the western world tradition, dealt with the
representation of moral issues in a two dimensional space.
The first historically identified dimension is related to
whether an action leads to harm and violence or not.
Later, the existence of a second dimension, associated to
justice and fairness was introduced. By analysis of lit-
erature extending across time, geography and scientific
disciplines, Haidt and coworkers introduced the main in-
gredient that yields a foundation theory [10]: humans
when classifying issues as either moral or immoral, nav-
igate not in a two dimensional space, but in one that is
at least five dimensional. Valuations along these dimen-
sions, called foundations in the literature of moral psy-
chology, are necessary to characterize the moral content
of a given issue.
Their striking quantitative result is extracted from
massive amounts of data: as the political spectrum is tra-
versed from liberal to conservative, there is an increase,
from two to five, in the number of moral dimensions
considered relevant to form opinions. Liberals regard
(a) harm/violence and (b)justice/fairness, the previously
identified dimensions, as the most relevant foundations.
In addition, conservatives hold (c) in-group loyalty, (d)
respect for authority and considerations about (e) purity
or sanctity in a considerable higher position than liberals.
That means that, independently of the semantic role of
the attributes, it can be asserted that liberals rely on a
different subset of moral foundations than conservatives.
We here employ liberal in the manner defined in the USA
as social liberal.
The data we have analyzed were furnished by Jonathan
Haidt [10, 22] [23] They were collected from the answers
to a specially designed questionnaire aimed at probing
opinions about morally relevant situations. For each of
N = 14250 respondents, Haidt and coworkers extracted
five dimensional moral vectors with components related
to five Moral Foundations. Each vector was labeled by
the subject’s self-declared political affiliation (p.a. ranges
from = 1 (very liberal) to 7(very conservative)).
The questionnaires consisted of 30 questions probing
the subject in the 5 moral dimensions. From the set
of answers the five dimensional vectors with components
in the interval [0, 5] are extracted. Thus a subject can
4FIG. 2. Empirical moral vectors: Three-dimensional projections of moral vectors for very liberal (p.a.= 1, blue) and
conservative (p.a.= 6, red) subjects. Axes are labeled according to the associated moral foundation.
either be represented as a point in the 30 dimensional
space of questions, or in the reduced moral foundation
space. It is interesting to see if the cloud of data points
have a similar structure in both spaces. A negative an-
swer would be indicative that the reduction has either
deleted or invented some structure. We stress that we are
not looking for clusters of different political affiliation in
this analysis. The data should, if the questionnaires are
relevant, characterize the relation between the complex
moral valuation systems and the simple one dimensional
continuous political affiliations.
The consistence of the five factors model has been al-
ready probed in [22]. We here confirm that the data
reduction is significant employing a visualization tech-
nique know as SPIN [24] used in the analysis of large
dimensional data sets in bioinformatics. It is a dimen-
sional reduction technique that identifies a nonlinear one
dimensional manifold irrespective of the embedding di-
mension of space. In both spaces we use an Euclidean
distance to measure how different are any two individu-
als. A permutation of a set of individuals is done in order
to give close labels to pairs that are close in the original
space and try to give them far apart labels in case their
distance is large. It has the advantage that the shape
of one dimensional structures can be identified. Figure
1 shows distance matrices for balanced sets of subjects.
Random samples of questionnaires were chosen keeping
the same sample size for each category of political affilia-
tion. In the left column we show the matrices before the
permutation, in the right column, after the permutation.
In the top row, we show the bare data from the 30 dimen-
sional space. In the lower row, the data of the reduced
5 dimensional space. The fact that the one dimensional
structure that can be seen embedded in both spaces is
similar, gives further support to the hypothesis that the
5 dimensional reduction to the moral foundations matrix
from the 30 dimensional questionnaires preserve a one
dimensional geometrical structure in the cloud of data
points which is associated to political affiliation.
Figure 2 depicts three components for p.a.=1 (very
liberal) and p.a.=6 (conservative). For comparison pur-
poses moral vectors Ji of the subjects were normalized
to unit length as in the statistical mechanics model. In
the model the vector Z is a symmetry breaking direc-
tion determined by the set of issues under discussion in
a society. This set is a complicated thing to define. In
particular, we have no access to the parsing that would
permit its representation in five dimensions. To make
possible a verification of the model, we have to identify
the analogous of the direction Z within the data. Looking
at Figure 2 a natural choice, further justified by consid-
ering the model dynamics, consists on identifying Z to
the average vector within the conservative (p.a.= 6) and
very conservative (p.a.= 7) classes.
We then calculate empirical histograms HE for hj =
Jj · Z, that can be interpreted as the effective number
of moral dimensions of a subject labeled by j. These
histograms HE characterize the different political group-
ings in a semantic free manner and will be compared to
similar statistics obtained using analytical methods and
numerical simulations.
III. STATISTICAL MECHANICS MODEL
Agents exchange information in the form of fields
hj = Jj · Z ∈ [−1, 1] that represent the mean opinion
of agent j on a large set of issues or, considering that the
information exchange is much faster than the adaptation
dynamics, the opinion agent j has about the mean issue.
The mean issue is objective and it is described by a set
5of D numbers Z ∈ SD.
The relevant variables, representing the society, are the
internal variables of the agents. Every agent j has two
main properties. (A) Its internal state is determined by
a set of D weights Jj (moral vector), which is invisible
to other agents. (B) The main hypothesis in this work
is that while weights jointly code for prior experience,
they are subject to change due to the social interactions
through a learning mechanism.
The vector Z changes in time reflecting social changes
in moral parsing or values. We, however, consider that
the adaptation dynamics of Jj is much faster than the
dynamics of Z and suppose the latter as being fixed. We
also concentrate on D = 5, but it might be interesting to
explore the consequences of using different values.
The only interaction among agents comes from learn-
ing about the opinion fields of agents in their social
neighborhood. Learning occurs in order to decrease the
psychological discomfort due to dissent. Learning is de-
scribed by a noisy gradient descent dynamics on a poten-
tial function describing a psychological cost of disagree-
ment with each of its social neighbors. In [7] we have
introduced a potential to model this and called it the
psychological cost, which depends on a parameter δ, tak-
ing values between 0 and 1. δ represents an attempt to
model different cognitive strategies with respect with how
novel or corroborating information is used in the learning
process. For δ = 0, as will be seen below, the agents can
be called error correctors. They only learn from social
neighbors from which they disagree by bringing a differ-
ent average opinion on the set of issues under discussion.
Thus we also refer to these agents as novelty seekers, for
they do not learn unless the information carries a new
and different point of view on the issues. For δ = 1,
learning occurs by extracting correlations. These agents
learn from neighbors always, independently of agreement
or disagreement. This led us to call them corroboration
seekers.
The family of psychological costs or interaction poten-
tials, indexed by δ (see figure 3) is defined by:
Vδ(hi, hj) = −1 + δ
2
hihj +
1− δ
2
|hihj | (3)
which can be written as Vδ = −δhihj for same sign opin-
ions and Vδ = −hihj for opinions of a different sign. We
can also consider the total cost for a group homogeneous
in δ leaving on a social graph G as
H =
∑
(i,j)∈G
Vδ(hi, hj). (4)
There are a few reasons that justify using the same δ for
both agents in each interaction. First there is evidence
[9] that people tend to interact more with those of simi-
lar cognitive styles. Second we have tried in simulations
with different δ’s in the same population and in different
social networks and the qualitative results are similar,
showing the robustness of this approximation. Finally a
FIG. 3. Psychological cost function Vδ(hi, hj) for differ-
ent values of δ, as a function of θi/pi , where hi = cos θi for
hj = 0.4 fixed. For fixed δ, the slope of the potential deter-
mines the scale of changes of the moral state vector. For δ = 0
changes only occur if there is a difference in the signs of opin-
ion fields hi and hj . For hj > 0 this occurs when hi becomes
negative at |θi| > pi/2. On the other extreme of cognitive
styles, for δ = 1, any difference in magnitude of opinions has
associated a slope of the cost function.
third reason is that it simplifies the analytical mean field
calculations which we discuss herein.
The specific form of the potential is inspired in learning
algorithms for linear classifiers [8, 12]. A Hebbian algo-
rithm can be considered to lead to learning from the use
of correlations in the input and output units. Informa-
tion from a pair (issue, opinion) will be embedded with
a strength independent of whether a prediction was cor-
rect or not. A Perceptron algorithm, on the other hand
works by error corrections. If the prediction, on an ex-
ample was correct, it will not do any changes. Changes
will be made only when the prediction was incorrect. In
this sense we can say that a Hebbian algorithm learns
both from corroborating and from new information. A
Perceptron algorithm will only learn from new informa-
tion.
Learning proceeds in the following way. We consider
a discrete time dynamics. At each time step an agent is
chosen and its weights are updated, if there is no noise in
the communication, using a gradient descent dynamics:
Ji(t+ 1) =
Ji(t)− ∇Ji(t)H
‖Ji(t)− ∇Ji(t)H‖
, (5)
where  defines the time scale.
We can also consider the case where noisy exchange of
opinions might drive the update uphill and to describe
this scenario we introduce an inverse temperature α and
a Monte Carlo Metropolis dynamics [25]. As usual, then
choose a D dimensional vector u drawn uniformly on a
6ball of radius . A trial weight vector is defined by
T =
Ji(t) + u
‖Ji(t) + u‖ (6)
and accepted as the new weight vector, Ji(t + 1) = T if
the social cost decreases: ∆H := H(T) − H(Ji(t)) ≤ 0.
If ∆H > 0 the change is accepted with probability
exp (−α∆H). This leads, after a transient, to a dis-
tribution of states given by the Boltzmann distribution
PB({Ji}) ∝ exp (−αH).
Alternatively we can proceed by making explicit the
hypothesis that the average social cost characterizes
macroscopic states and suppose that the expected value
E[H] has a certain value. The distribution of probabilities
for the moral vectors of the agents has to be chosen from
among those that satisfy the information constraint and
makes the least amount of additional hypotheses. This
is the natural framework of maximum entropy, which
leads again to the Boltzmann distribution. The param-
eter α, which characterizes the noise level in the first
approach, appears now as a Lagrange multiplier. It can
be seen to determine the scale in which changes in so-
cial cost, brought about by differences in opinion, are
important. This justifies being called the scale of peer
pressure. Thus the scale of peer pressure is analogous to
the noise amplitude of the exchange of information and
to an inverse temperature in statistical mechanics. If
there is a high level of noise, then the opinions of others
will not be very influential, thus a low peer pressure. As
the dependence of fluctuations on temperature permits
measurements of one in terms of the other, in statisti-
cal mechanics, fluctuations in opinions may be used to
characterize the level of peer pressure in a society.
This system has been studied using Monte Carlo meth-
ods and Mean Field methods. The main empirical finding
we focus on is the difference in the number of moral foun-
dations between self declared liberals and conservatives.
To study this we need to introduce an appropriate or-
der parameter. Our model has no semantics. Concepts
like “pure”, “harmless”, “loyal” in our model are just
represented by indistinguishable dimensions of a vector
space. The possibility of rotating the frame of reference
shows that any initial interpretation of the coordinates
is meaningless. But the set of issues under discussion in-
troduces a symmetry breaking direction Z, that may be
regarded as the simplest vector to characterize the soci-
ety and what its members are discussing. We take this to
be the direction parallel to the vector where all coordi-
nates are 1, where all moral foundations are present and
considered important. Our strategy then is to character-
ize both the state of the agents model and the empirical
questionnaire data by introducing rotationally invariant
order parameters which are semantically free as far as
possible. Further analysis of the semantics of the model
would be outside the present scope of this paper.
Simulated histograms HS for opinion fields h are cal-
culated as equilibrium distributions in a Monte Carlo
Metropolis dynamics run in a social graph that we here
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FIG. 4. Cognitive style and political affiliation. The
similarity of experimental and simulated histograms suggests
a link between cognitive style and political affiliation. In this
figure δ is chosen at a fixed peer pressure α to yield a sim-
ulated histogram that matches empirical histograms. The
insets show empirical histograms (black full line) and simu-
lated histograms (dashed red line) for the case α = 8. The
social graph is a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) network [26] with av-
erage degree k¯ = 22 (branching parameter M = 11) and size
N = 400. The horizontal location of the insets is indicative of
the political affiliation group to which the empirical histogram
pertains. The best δ are depicted by the lines for several α.
The case α = 8 is indicated as a red dashed line. The rela-
tion suggests that liberals have smaller δ than conservatives,
meaning that liberals rely less on corroborating information
that conservatives.
choose to be a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) network [26] with
average degree k¯ = 22 (branching parameter M = 11)
and size N = 400. As the relation between the cognitive
parameter δ and empirical affiliation p.a. is unknown we
proceed by fixing the also unknown (but robust) peer
pressure parameter α and finding, for each p.a. = 1 to 6
the δ that minimizes an Euclidean distance between sim-
ulated histograms HS(` | δ, α) and empirical histograms
HE(`) defined as
D [HS | HE ] =
L∑
`=−L
[HS(` | δ, α)−HE(`)]2 , (7)
where the interval [−1,+1] for h is appropriately binned
such that h(`) = `/L for ` = −L, ..., L. This procedure
results in the curves depicted in Figure 4. The model
behavior is consistent with empirical evidence [14] in its
general features, namely, δ is a nondecreasing function
of the empirical political affiliation. We also notice the
robustness in the qualitative behaviour as we vary the
peer pressure α. For the fits depicted as insets in the
figure we use α = 8.
We also calculate thermodynamic quantities by em-
ploying the Wang-Landau technique [7, 27]. By do-
ing that we are able to compute the phase diagram
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FIG. 5. Phase diagram in the space δ vs α. The case
depicted corresponds to a BA network with average degree
k¯ = 22 and size N = 400. Points correspond to 20 runs
of a Wang-Landau algorithm. The insets show the histogram
HS(h) obtained as the equilibrium of a Monte Carlo Metropo-
lis dynamics with peer preassure α = 8 and δ provided by the
optimization process that yields Figure 4. The location of
the insets is indicative of the parameters δ and α used in the
simulation. Full line indicates a fit α ∝ 1/δ, with red dashed
lines corresponding to 95% confidence error bars.
of Figure 5. From the point of view of ordering, the
resulting diagram is straightforward exhibiting an or-
dered m = 〈h〉 > 0 phase and a disordered phase with
m = 〈h〉 = 0 separated by a continuous transition line
that is well-fitted, in the case of a Baraba´si-Albert net-
work, by a simple power law α ∝ 1/δ [7].
IV. MEAN FIELD ANALYSIS
This section aims at providing theoretical support to
the numerical results previously presented. Our under-
standing of the model can be enriched by studying a
tractable approximation with qualitatively similar behav-
ior. Let us consider the set of issues to be fixed (quenched
disorder). In the analysis of this section we will not deal
with the difficult task of averaging over quenched dis-
order, since it would draw attention and direct energy
to technical issues beyond our current purpose. We fix
a set of issues and study the resulting thermodynamics.
The problem is still not simple and an exact solution for
the statistical mechanics problem is not known. Here
we present mean field results obtained from information
theory considerations in the form of a Maximum Entropy
argument. We introduce a space of tractable probability
distributions, which factor over groups of agents. The
first and simplest choice is to consider a tractable family
that factors over the individual agents: P0 =
∏
i Pi. The
parametrization of Pi will be done in terms of the order
parameters which we still do not know. An advantage of
the mean field approach along these lines is that it tells
the relevant order parameters. Our problem is reduced
to minimization of the relative entropy
S [P0‖PB ] = −
∫ (∏
i
dµ(Ji)
)
P0 ln
P0
PB
− λ(〈P0〉µ − 1)− α〈H − E〉µ (8)
where PB is the Boltzmann distribution for the above
Hamiltonian, PB = exp(−αH)/Z and dµ(Ji) is the uni-
form measure over the surface of the D sphere. The
relevant constraints that have to be taken into account
are normalization and that the expected value 〈H〉µ has a
given fixed value E , which might even be unknown, but is
important in characterizing the state of the agent society
at least with respect to the opinions about the issues.
We can drop the logarithm of the original partition
function lnZ without changing the variational problem
to obtain, from equations (3) and (8)
S [P0‖PB ] = −
∑
i
∫
dµ(Ji)Pi lnPi − λ
∫
dµ(Ji)Pi
− α
∑
(i,j)
∫
dµ(Ji)dµ(Jj)PiPjVδ(hi, hj)
and considering variations of the set of Pi,
δS[P0‖PB ]
δPi
= 0,
leads to
0 = −1− λ− lnPi − α
∑
(j),ν
∫
dµ(Jj)PjVδ(hi, hj)
This is an expression relating the probability density of
an agent to those of the social neighbors:
Pi ∝ exp
−α∑
j
∫
dµ(Jj)PjVδ(hi, hj)
 (9)
8FIG. 6. Mean field theory : (a) m = 〈h〉 as a function of total peer pressure kα for δ = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0 (from top to
bottom) (b) vm = 〈h2〉 − 〈h〉2 as a function of kα (δ from bottom up in the right side of the picture). (c) Phase diagram. (d)
width of distribution vm as a function of δ, for fixed kα = 10 (circles) and 11 (triangles).
Now we go back to the problem of choosing the family
of distributions Pi. The main reason to call a family
tractable is that the set of equations above is closed. De-
pending on the structure of the Hamiltonian, different
families can be used.
The form of the Hamiltonian imposes the use of two
order parameters for each issue, which in order to close
the set, we take to be independent of the agent,∫
dµ(Jj)PjVδ(hi, hj) = −1 + δ
2
him+
1− δ
2
|hi|r (10)
where we have introduced
m =
∫
dµ(Jj)Pj Jj · x (11)
r =
∫
dµ(Jj)Pj |Jj · x| (12)
In principle the order parameters m and r could have an
index j identifying the agent, but we make a reasonable
assumption of homogeneity. This does not mean that all
agents are equal, but that they will present values of the
moral vector Ji drawn from the same probability distri-
bution. Then the mean field probability distribution is
given by
PMF({J}|kα, δ,m, r) =
∏
i
PMF(Ji|kα, δ,m, r) (13)
=
∏
i
exp
{
kα
(
1+δ
2 him− 1−δ2 |hi|r
)}
Zi ,
where the denominators
∏
iZi ensure normalization and
k is the number of social neighbors. Now equations 11
and 12 can be seen not as the definitions of m and r, but
as the self consistent mean field theory equations from
which their values can be calculated.
The model can be studied for any value of the dimen-
sion of the internal space, D. We use D = 5 and our
problem is reduced to doing some integrals of up to five
dimensions. Since there is only one symmetry breaking
direction Z, we rotate the coordinate system such that Z
is in the eˆ5 direction. The polar angle θ3 := θ with this
direction is the only non trivial integration variable since
the other angular variables (θ0, θ1 and θ2) drop out and
are trivial.
Call B(θ|kα, δ,m, r) := exp {kα (am cos θ − br| cos θ|)}
where a := 1+δ2 and b :=
1−δ
2 , then
m =
1
Z
∫ pi
0
dθ sin3 θ cos θB(θ|kα, δ,m, r)
r =
1
Z
∫ pi
0
dθ sin3 θ| cos θ|B(θ|kα, δ,m, r)
Z =
∫ pi
0
dθ sin3 θB(θ|kα, δ,m, r) (14)
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FIG. 7. Mean field theory histograms. Left column: Empirical histograms. Right column : mean field results. To recover
histograms for p.a. > 4 a larger kα is required. Vertical axes are shared in each row.
Equations 14 can be solved numerically self consistently.
Results in Figure 6a show the fixed points m as a function
of the total peer pressure, showing the existence of a
phase transition as the critical line of total peer pressure
kαc(δ) depicted in 6c is crossed. The critical total peer
pressure kαc decreases with larger values of δ. Figure 6b
shows the width of the distribution of overlaps (denoted
vm). An important prediction of the theory is that this
depends strongly on the corroboration parameter δ as it
can be seen in Figure 6d.
We can use equation 14 to calculate the distribution of
opinions about the symmetry breaking direction Z
P (h|kα, δ) =
∫
dµ(J)δ(J ·Z− h)PMF(J|kα, δ,m, r) (15)
This is a mean field prediction that can be confronted
to Monte Carlo simulations and, more importantly, to
experimental data. The result is
P (h|kα, δ) = 1
C
(1− h2) exp {kα (ahm− br|h|)} (16)
where C =
∫ 1
−1(1−z2) exp {kα (azm− br|z|)} dz, is given
to good approximation by
C =
2eδm˜
δ2m˜2
(
1− 1
δm˜
)
− 1− δ
δm˜
+
2(m˜− 1)
m˜3
e−m˜ (17)
where m˜ = kαm and we used that in the experimentally
relevant region m = r. Approximately
P (h|kα, δ) = (δm˜)
2
2
(1− h2)e−δm˜(1−h) (18)
This comparison is shown in Figure 7, it hints that
the similarity of the data and theory point to a relation
between δ for the agents and political affiliation for the
experimental subjects. Histograms for the more conser-
vative groups resemble more the histograms for agents
with higher δ’s; i.e. conservative behavior is more likely
to be identified with larger reliance on corroboration and
alternatively liberal behavior, with smaller reliance.
V. FACEBOOK NETWORK
In the previous sections we have based our discussion
on simulations run on regular and “synthetic” BA net-
works. In this section we present simulation results on a
realistic network extracted from Facebook network data
[28, 29] [30].
In figure 8 we show a comparison between empirical
HE(h) histograms and the best fit, in terms of a the Eu-
clidean metric, for the Princeton graph (size N = 6596
10
FIG. 8. Histograms for empirical data, synthetic and Facebook networks. Left panel: The thick black lines are the
empirical histograms HE(h), dashed red lines are the simulated histograms HS(h) with a Baraba´si-Albert construction of size
N = 800 and k¯ = 22. The peer pressure is fixed to α = 8. The thin green line are the simulated histograms HS(h) using
Princeton’s Facebook network (N = 6596 and k¯ = 89) with α = 1.98. Right panel: Best δ as a function of p.a. for the BA
network (dashed red lines) and for Princeton’s Facebook network (thin green line).
and average degree k¯ = 88.9) and for a Baraba´si-Albert
construction with N = 800 and k¯ = 22 [26]. To build the-
oretical histograms we have run Metropolis simulations
[7] fixing k¯α = 176 in both scenarios and choosing, for
each p.a, a δ that minimizes the metric defined by Eq. 7.
As it is suggested by the mean-field approximation of
the previous section, histograms only depend on the so-
cial graph topology through the average degree k¯. Also
we see that to find the peer pressure per social neighbor
α we have first to measure the average degree indepen-
dently.
VI. DYNAMICS: WHAT DO CONSERVATIVE
AGENTS CONSERVE?
In addition to obtaining that novelty seeker agents
are identified with liberals and that corroboration seeker
agents are more similar to conservatives, the model can
be studied to determine dynamic collective properties. In
particular we study in this section how groups of agents
identified with conservative or liberal differ in time scales
to adopt new positions. Given the relation between po-
litical affiliations and the corroboration parameter sug-
gested by the model, it would be a contradiction if charac-
teristic reaction times to changes in the symmetry break-
ing direction Z turn out to decrease with increasing δ. So,
putting the theory to the test, we now turn to study the
response to changes of the issues and how the group ac-
commodates to such changes. Once the MC simulation
has equilibrated, we change the Z. The new direction
and the old one have an overlap Zold · Znew = cos ζ. We
continue the Metropolis simulation and characterize, as
a function of simulation time, the distance to the equilib-
rium distribution. A natural distance from equilibrium
would be a measure of the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
However, we do not have access to a theoretical form of
the out-of-equilibrium distribution. A simpler procedure
is to calculate a distance directly from the histograms.
After a MC step, which includes a learning sweep over
the whole population, we obtain Ht(h) the histogram of
opinions hnew = J ·Znew about the new symmetry break-
ing direction, giving the fraction of agents with opinion
in a given range. Define the Euclidean distance by
D [Ht|Heq] =
1∑
h=−1
(Ht(h)−Heq(h))2 (19)
where the range of the variable mZ has been discretized
into 20 bins. The distance from equilibrium as a function
of time can be parametrized as D(t) = F (ζ)e−t/τ , where
the measured τ = τ(ζ, α, δ) appears in figure 9. The val-
ley, shown in blue, shows the region where the agents are
faster to re-equilibrate adapting to the new conditions.
It occurs inside the ordered phase, not in the high δ re-
gion of the conservatives, nor at the border of the phase
transition. This is to be expected, since at the border
there is critical slowing down. The interesting thing is
that the group of agents that re-adapts to equilibrium
the fastest is the one which has been identified with the
most liberal subjects of the data.
The surprise lies not in that ultra-liberals adapt the
fastest, but that our simple model is also consistent in
this respect. This result is central to our proposal for in-
terpreting what conservative and liberal means in a group
of agents. Agents with high δ are conservative and with
lower δ more liberal, also in terms of their time to adapt
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FIG. 9. Characteristic re-adaptation times. The topology is the same used to produce figure 5. Dashed lines indicate the
phase transition. A rotation by an angle of ζ = 0.6pi rad has been employed as a perturbation to the Zeitgeist vector Z all
over, however, conclusions are general. (a) Re-adaptation times τ as a function of α and δ. Arrows indicate political affiliation
scores as identified in figure 4, from p.a. = 1 (very liberal) at left to p.a. = 6 at right. Note that the minimum time occurs at
values of δ inside the ordered phase (see figure 5) and that this value of δ corresponds to liberal and very liberal scores (figure
4). (b) Re-adaptation times τ are inferred by regressing logD against t. R2 statistics are indicative that the data fits employed
are only relevant inside the ordered phase.
to changes. Based on this we can attribute political labels
to the agents which are consistent with the attribution
based on the data since they show the same dependence
on δ.
VII. DISCUSSION: DIVERSITY OF
COGNITIVE STYLES
Statistics and reaction times permit identifying differ-
ent cognitive styles with different effective dimensions or
opinions about a mean issue (that we call Zeitgeist in [7]).
Therefore given that people do present different cognitive
styles and that they interact and learn from each other we
expect that there will be people who hold different sets
of moral values. Cultural wars will follow from diversity
of cognitive styles.
This is a semantic free conclusion. The model can-
not distinguish between the different moral foundations.
There must be another reason why some of the foun-
dations are always present while others may be absent.
Evolutionary arguments by Haidt go a long way in ex-
plaining why the harm/care and justice dimensions are
more uniformly common. They may be found, to some
extent in other primates [31, 32]. The emergence of the
other dimensions, which seem to be present only in hu-
mans, are supposed to foster higher cooperation levels
and ultra-social behavior. Suppose, as we do, these facts
to be reasonable, then the question that emerges is why
society has kept all types of cognitive styles and not only
those that lead to a more cohesive society? A possibil-
ity is that different strategies within a society are useful
to cope collectively with different challenges. Higher co-
operation level gives higher fitness during times where
current opinions lead to correct answers from a survival
point of view. Conservative behavior would then be the
fittest when maintaining current behavior is beneficial to
the society. However, during times when current opinions
are not guiding in the finding of useful answers, in a sur-
vival enhancing sense, a different perspective is needed.
A larger menu of choices may permit finding better al-
ternatives in an efficiently distributed manner.
When the Zeitgeist changes, due to external condi-
tions, or due to a new issue being introduced to the
debate, a more liberal approach seems reasonable. The
question, from the current perspective, is then translated
to whether this behavior can be seen within our model.
In figure 4 we presented a connection between agents
characterized with a given δ parameter and the political
affiliation of the questionnaire respondents. A question
that arises is why a lower but nonzero value of δ was
found for a peer pressure around α = 10 which is well in-
side the ordered phase? Why were not the ultra-liberals
associated to a δ right on the edge of the phase transi-
tion? Maybe the reason can be found in the dynamics of
adaptation to the new Zeitgeist. We find from the simula-
tions, within the appropriate α region, that at that value,
δ ≈ 0.20 − 0.35 the characteristic time of re-adaptation
to a new Zeitgeist has a minimum (see figure 9). The
lower the conservatism of a population the less cohesive-
ness it will present in responding to external challenges
as a group. There is no benefit in being more liberal
than necessary. Ultra-liberals are not on the disordered
phase, but in the ordered phase. They even are not at
the border of the transition, they are in a way prevented
from being on the disordered phase by critical slowing
down. Closer to the border the system is softer but takes
longer to rearrange. And from our results it seems that
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even the ultra-liberals observed in the data rely on some
corroboration in order to construct their moral vector.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The modeling of social systems has a long (and well-
fought [1]) history. It might be surprising to some that
a mathematical model can be constructed and directly
confronted to data, replicating some statistical findings
and making predictions borne out by observations. We
believe that this is possible by setting the problem in
the context of information theory. After relevant vari-
ables were identified, information about neurocognitive,
psychological and social science was used to attribute a
probability distribution for the variables, which is finally
used to estimate relevant experimental signatures from
order parameters. This is, ultimately, what is done in
traditional areas of Physics.
We have presented results from Monte Carlo numeri-
cal methods and analytical approximation schemes such
as mean field for a model of interacting agents. These
techniques are suited to study the collective or aggre-
gate properties of our model of agents. Drastic changes
in collective properties signal phase transitions and the
emergence of different regimes of behavior.
The neural networks of the agents are quite simple.
The only way to know if exaggerated simplifications have
been made is to compare with data. Even if not useful
for heuristic confrontation, models may be be useful in
their own right as laboratories where we develop intuition
about the different methodologies needed to extract in-
formation from possible more complex models of the fu-
ture. They help in formulating a set of questions that
can be addressed experimentally and theoretically. By
pointing out their own limitations, current models can
bring us closer to more useful models in the future. The
networks are not supposed to model the brain networks
of individuals, but rather the fact that people integrate
the different moral dimensions of an issue, weighted by
their own views about the importance of each dimension,
in order to reach conclusions in an intuitionist way rather
than by using a rationalist if-then set of rules.
A summary of conclusions about our results should
first of all mention what we have not attempted to do.
No mention of any evolutionary perspective of how the
moral foundations came to be was presented. In par-
ticular it seems reasonable to agree about the possible
enhanced fitness that may derive from increased social
capital of a more ordered society but this should be cen-
tral in future discussions. If this is granted, then we have
to answer why lower social capital promoting cognitive
strategies should be present and not have been eradi-
cated by selection. Are liberals just free riders invading
a society of authority/loyalty/purity respecting conser-
vatives? Trying to stay aside of semantic interpretations,
we give an evolutionary reason why cognitive styles com-
patible with liberal behavior are found in modern times
and have not been purged. Reaction times of the society
of agents show that it is consistent to call large δ agents as
conservatives, since they have a large equilibration time
under changes of the Zeitgeist. On the flip side, small
δ is expected to correlate with liberal fast adapting be-
havior under the same changes. But this was common
knowledge. What is the novelty of conservatives taking
more time to re-adapt than liberals? We found that lib-
erals do not correspond to a δ = 0 cognitive style. Not
only conservatives, but also liberals are on the ordered
side of the phase diagram. But as we approach the dis-
ordered phase, critical slowing down sets in. So agents
with δ too small will also have large equilibration times
and these have probably been eliminated. A compromise
between being fast to re-adapt and having high social
capital shapes the societies of agents that live in an ever
changing environment.
We have shown that different cognitive styles give rise
through social interactions to different statistics about
the opinion field h. The interactions are represented by
a potential that although it was never intended to claim
precise realism it captures several stylized features of hu-
man cognitive styles. We have been cautious to allow
agents to learn from opposing views. While this may
not always occur in human interactions, there are cer-
tain windows of time where people acquire their moral
values from their social network of interactions. Qualita-
tive information from fMRI and psychological tests about
cognitive properties have been used to construct the in-
teractions but future work will have to refine the learn-
ing algorithms. Agents in social networks have shown a
better agreement with the experimental data than simu-
lations in e.g. square lattices and the model successfully
predicts what sort of connectivity is to be expected if
the subjacent social network is complex. We feel that it
is rather remarkable that from the answers of question-
naires and by postulating certain information exchange
mechanisms something about the topology of the social
interactions of a society can be inferred.
Many questions are raised. While we are aware of the
previous use of the term peer pressure, we have intro-
duced a quantitative definition that might lead to exper-
imental characterization and measurement. This might
help deciding whether our concept is useless or not, but
it is the nature of experimental work to help decide rel-
evance. An interesting consequence of our approach and
of the idea of peer pressure is that histograms of effec-
tive dimensions might change after external threats to a
society are detected. From the properties of the model
we can predict that the mean of histograms H(h) will
increase and variances of the distribution will be reduced
after external threats are detected. The model also pre-
dicts that societies that discuss a wider set of issues will
move in an opposite direction, with a reduction of the
mean of H(h) and an increase of its variance.
Several methodological problems are raised and should
be analyzed, among them, the measurement of the peer
pressure, the parsing of moral discourse into 5 or more
13
dimensional vectors, the determination of the Zeitgeist
vector, time scales of change. Among the theoretical
topics, we should approach the problem of semantics and
dress the different moral dimension of the model with
an interpretation in the language of moral philosophers.
Evolutionary considerations will probably guide the pro-
cess and break the remaining symmetries. We have also
neither addressed a possible role of genetic factors in-
fluencing cognitive styles nor if the value of δ depends
on the agent’s environment. For the latter we will have
to consider more sophisticated learning algorithms. Un-
derstanding evolutionary and cognitive influences behind
cultural wars and their mathematical modeling seems to
be a reachable goal.
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